




The Logic of Appropriability:  














2006/21  September 2006
L LE EM M   
Laboratory of Economics and Management 
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies 
Piazza Martiri della Libertà, 33 - 56127 PISA (Italy) 
Tel. +39-050-883-343  Fax +39-050-883-344 
Email: lem@sssup.it  Web Page: http://www.lem.sssup.it/ 
 











Sidney G. Winter 
 
 
Deloitte and Touche Professor of Management 
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania 
Suite 2000, SH-DH, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia PA 19104-6370, USA 



















September 7, 2006 2
The Logic of Appropriability:  From Schumpeter to Arrow to Teece 
 
Sidney G. Winter 






This note expounds the abstract fundamentals of the appropriability problem, re-assessing 
insights from three classic contributions – those of Schumpeter, Arrow and Teece.  
Whereas the first two contributions were explicitly concerned with the implications of 
appropriability for society at large, Teece’s main concern was with practical questions of 
business strategy and economic organization.  This note argues that, his practical 
concerns notwithstanding, Teece contributed, en passant but fundamentally, to the 
clarification of basic questions that previous authors had addressed less comprehensively 
and less satisfactorily.  Specifically, his analysis of the innovator’s access to 
complementary assets, undertaken from a contracting perspective, can be seen as filling a 
significant gap in the previous theoretical discussion of appropriability.   
Key words:  Appropriability, innovation, complementary assets, patents, intellectual 
property. 
 
The Logic of Appropriability:  From Schumpeter to Arrow to Teece 
 
Sidney G. Winter 
The Wharton School 
 
The greatest homage that can be paid to a scholarly contribution is, in my view, the 
reader’s private acknowledgment that the world looked different to me after I read that.  
When I write, I hope to achieve such a result in at least a few readers – or at least this is 
so when I am in a particularly ambitious and optimistic mood.  I suspect that the well-
justified fame of David Teece’s 1986 article in Research Policy is attributable to the fact 
that a great many readers had such a reaction, recognizing the change the article 
produced in their basic perceptions.  
In this instance, the transformation of my own perceptions actually pre-dated the 
publication that we now celebrate.  It was not reading, but hearing, David’s paper that 
worked the transformation.  The occasion was the famous Venice Innovation Conference 
of March 1986, organized by the young Giovanni Dosi.  I recall that scene very well. I 
recall the sloshing of the canal waters against the walls of the old church in which we 
met.  I recall delighting in the insight that the sound of sharply reversed engines and 
churning water (accompanied by angry shouts) was the urban-aquatic equivalent of 
screeching brakes (and angry shouts).  I recall the powerful sense of illumination from 
David’s remarks. And I recall Dick Nelson’s opening line as he began his discussion of 
David’s paper:  “I think we can all agree that we have just heard a very important paper.”   
For this brief celebratory note, I have limited objectives.  Reverting to my one-time role 
as a teacher of microeconomic theory, I seek mainly to expound in a straightforward way  2
the abstract fundamentals of the appropriability problem, re-assessing insights from three 
classic contributions – those of Schumpeter, Arrow and Teece.  The first two  
contributions were explicitly concerned with the implications of appropriability for 
society at large, whereas such a concern is largely implicit in Teece – but it is not hard to 
detect that he considers society to be generally well-served by innovative, profitable 
business firms.  
Joseph Schumpeter 
Schumpeter framed the appropriability problem in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(Schumpeter 1950) by sharply highlighting the apparent contradiction between perfect 
competition and the historical progressiveness of the capitalist system, i.e., its innovative 
performance.  Only some departure from perfect competition can afford the innovator the 
opportunity to appropriate some of the gains of the innovation.  
“The introduction of new methods of production and new commodities is 
hardly conceivable with perfect – and perfectly prompt – competition from 
the start.  And this means that the bulk of what we call economic progress 
is incompatible with it.  As a matter of fact, perfect competition is and 
always has been temporarily suspended whenever anything new is being 
introduced – automatically or by measures devised for the purpose – even 
in otherwise perfectly competitive conditions.”  ((Schumpeter 1950), p. 
105). 
What lies behind “hardly conceivable”?  Presumably, the judgment that innovation is 
ordinarily the fruit of prior innovative effort, voluntarily directed to the end of bringing it 
about.     Such effort is costly, involving at a minimum the time and attention devoted by 
the innovator, and the incurring of these costs must be motivated if the innovation is to 
occur.  And why the studied qualification “and perfectly prompt?”  Because any interval 
of time ∆t in which the innovator can receive price P for production that costs c < P 
provides a return (P-c) ∆t to the innovator that might conceivably cover the costs of the  3
innovation.  The role of “perfectly prompt” is thus to exclude lead-time as a mechanism 
of appropriability for the innovator.   Lead-time is often complemented by a dose of 
secrecy, which can preclude the possibility that imitating rivals run virtually abreast of 
the innovator in the race to get to the market.   
On reflection, we see that Schumpeter’s artful construction here makes it easy to miss the 
fact that his “perfectly prompt” substantially undercuts the force of his “hardly 
conceivable.”  Actually, it is very conceivable that a realistically competitive situation 
affords adequate incentives for some level of innovation, because “perfectly prompt” is 
not a realistic feature.  Needless to say, the larger the gap one concedes between the sort 
of competition encountered in practice and the theoretical ideal, the more room one tends 
to make available in which innovators might find ways to appropriate gains.  The realistic 
and significant issue is how much and what sort of innovative effort gets past the 
incentive screen, and what does the level of ex ante uncertainty have to do with that 
question? 
In short, it is only a theorist’s super-stylized version of a competitive market system that 
is strictly incompatible with all innovation incentives.  That limited observation, offered 
from the lofty heights of theory, is nevertheless a very powerful one.  Schumpeter’s rich 
discussion contains a number of complementary insights on the sorts of protections 
innovation requires, and the short and long run consequences of those protections for the 
system.  He emphasized, of course, the role of large-scale enterprise:  “As soon as we go 
into details and inquire into the individual items in which progress was most conspicuous, 
the trail leads not to the doors of those firms that work under conditions of comparatively 
free competition, but precisely to the doors of the large concerns ….” (p. 82).   On the  4
question of what it was about large scale that made the difference, he was fecund and 
provocative but less than clear.   He touched upon the fact that some innovations are 
themselves indivisible and also on the fact that the innovating firm must be sturdy enough 
to carry the financial risks involved.  
Overall, Schumpeter’s argument led him to conclude that “… perfect competition is not 
only impossible but inferior, and has no title to being set up as a model of ideal 
efficiency.”  (p. 106).  (Well, maybe we should concede a claim to ideal static 
efficiency.)   
Kenneth Arrow 
In his classic 1962 paper (Arrow 1962), Arrow juxtaposed a fundamental conceptual 
discussion of the economics of information with a model of innovation incentives.
1  The 
model is a relatively simple one in terms of the analytical apparatus employed,
2 but has a 
substantial subtlety that derives both from the broader conceptual discussion on which it 
rests, and from a more specific advance in the conceptualization of the appropriability 
problem.   
The broader discussion shows how the fundamental properties of information make it a 
highly problematic case for the linkage between the efficient allocation of resources and 
competitive markets.  In particular, Arrow’s “fundamental paradox” points out that when 
                                                 
1 The problem was actually posed in terms of incentives to invent, possibly because the paper was 
originally presented to a conference on the economics of invention, and I will now generally adhere to this 
terminology in discussing Arrow.  Actually, the analysis could relate to either invention or innovation.  On 
the innovation interpretation, it assumes that the invention is in hand but there are additional one-time costs 
of innovating.  The assumption that these costs can be accurately foreseen may actually be somewhat more 
plausible than the corresponding assumption about invention. 
2 A substantial theoretical literature subsequently emerged, which embedded Arrow’s version of the 
incentive question in various more complex settings.  An early example was Dasgupta, P. and J. Stiglitz 
(1980). "Uncertainty, industrial structure, and the speed of R&D." The Bell Journal of Economics 11(1): 1-
28..        5
information itself is the commodity being transacted, there is a clear tension if not an 
outright contradiction between the (usual) assumption that the buyer knows what she is 
paying for and the assumption that she is willing to pay for it.  If the buyer already 
knows, why would she want to pay to get the same thing again?  It is the fact that it is 
indeed “the same thing again” that reflects the distinctive properties of information; the 
incremental value of second receipt of the same information is presumptively zero since 
the first receipt can provide all desired service.  These market failure problems in the 
market for information, highlighted by Arrow, remain an important contemporary theme 
both in theory and practice.   
In the specific foundations of his model, Arrow simply set aside the appropriability 
problem that he had just illuminated by his conceptual discussion.  Implicitly, he posited 
a perfect property right in the information underlying a specific productive technique, 
which is relevant to a single industry.  The property right can be interpreted as an ideal 
patent – unambiguous, costlessly enforceable, and of infinite duration.
3  Further, the 
availability of this protection and the production cost implications of the information 
involved are evidently fully known to the inventor ex ante, before the inventive effort has 
been exerted.  The focus is on the incentive to invent – the gross return the inventor can 
capture.  The size of that incentive will determine whether the inventor can realize a net 
return from making the invention, and therefore, also, whether the invention will in fact 
be made. 
                                                 
3 The model was actually formulated in static or single-period terms.  However, the costs of the invention 
are once-and-for-all and the returns are presumably  flows of some duration.  Hence (I tell the students), 
there is a units problem lurking here.  The simplest way to deal with it is to assume the flows are constants 
and take present values to infinity.    6
What this framework permits is a clear separation of the aspects of the appropriability 
problem associated with the protection of the information itself --  which is assumed to be 
assured by the ideal patent – and the aspects that are intertwined with the context of use 
of the invention.  In particular, consider the context of an industry facing a downward-
sloping demand curve, and in which production is occurring at the constant unit costs 
made possible by some existing technique that is freely available to the industry.  If the 
inventor comes up with a technique that permits production at a lower cost, there is 
clearly a potential for social benefit.  This might take various forms and could accrue to 
the inventor, to consumers of the product, or perhaps to owners of firms in the industry.  
If the inventor can appropriate a portion of the benefits that exceeds his costs of 
invention, that will provide the incentive to make the invention, and a net social benefit 
will likely ensue. 
The principal focus of Arrow’s analysis was on the way the pre-invention structure of the 
output market affects the possible gains from the invention.  The most straightforward 
version of the argument is simply that competitive output is larger than (simple) 
monopoly output, for familiar textbook reasons.  Hence, a given amount of unit cost 
reduction is more valuable if the industry is initially competitive.
4  Protected by his 
perfect patent, the inventor can simply license the invention to the industry on uniform 
terms, a per-unit royalty representing all but a trivial portion of the cost savings that the 
invention makes possible.  Output does not change, and society foregoes the portion of 
the potential benefit that would be attainable by increasing production at the new level of 
marginal cost.   
                                                 
4 As Arrow shows, the approximation provided by this simple story tends to perfection as the cost reduction 
gets smaller.  In the interest of brevity, I do not address Arrow’s analysis of the opposite case, a“radical” 
invention that implies a  new monopoly price below the old competitive price.  7
Superficially, the same analysis would seem to apply to the monopoly case, with the only 
difference being that the monopoly output is lower.  This is not the case, however.  The 
inventor could presumably make an all-or-nothing deal with the monopolist, which is 
difficult to arrange for a competitive industry.  Such a deal could, at the extreme, yield to 
the inventor the full increment of monopoly profit that the invention makes possible, an 
amount that exceeds the cost reduction on the pre-invention monopoly output by the 
profit (at the new cost) on the increment of monopoly output.  This total “monopoly 
incentive” for the inventor is, as Arrow shows, still less than the competitive incentive 
previously analyzed. 
There is another issue lurking here, one that prefigures the analysis in Teece (1986), but 
which Arrow skillfully sidestepped.  The actual assumption in Arrow’s monopoly case is 
that only the monopolist is capable of the invention, so monopolist and inventor are one 
and the same.  This summarily dispatches the problem of how the gains would be shared 
between the monopolist and an outside inventor -- which is a simple case of the 
complementary assets problem that Teece subsequently addressed.   It is, of course, far 
from obvious that an outside inventor would generally have the bargaining power needed 
to assure appropriation of all the gross returns.  If, however, the question is simply the 
adequacy of the incentives to make this particular invention (Arrow’s concern), then it 
does follow that when this question is close, the monopolist has the (small) incentive to 
concede approximately all the gross returns in order to get the deal done.  On a broader 
interpretation – e.g. if  inventors look to typical or analogous returns in deciding how 
much effort to put into a particular (uncertain) case – the prospect of sharing the returns   8
from a  big winner with an incumbent monopolist will certainly diminish the incentives 
facing an independent inventor.  
Arrow, like Schumpeter, was generally disposed to the view that the market system had 
intrinsic limitations in dealing with innovation, hence that incentives to invent might be 
inadequate from a social welfare standpoint, and that the amount of progress produced 
might be sub-optimal.  Here I put the optimality issues aside and consider how a simple 
elaboration of the analysis provides a perspective on the question of how much 
innovation happens.  Suppose the economy faces a population of independent invention 
opportunities of the Arrow type.  Pursuing a particular opportunity involves costs Ci.  
When the inventor pursues appropriability strategy j, the realized total benefit is Vij, and 
the inventor appropriates    Sij Vij , leaving a benefit of  (1 – Sij) Vij  for the remainder of 
society.  Assuming the accurate ex ante comparison of private costs and benefits for the 
inventor, the individual invention happens when, for at least one strategy j, the inventor 
anticipates receiving      Sij Vij > Ci.  Overall inventive activity is the sum of these cases 
over the population.   
Various obvious remarks can be made on the basis of numerical examples constructed 
within this simple scheme, including ones supporting the tradition of “desirable 
inventions might not get made, for want of an adequate appropriability strategy.”  On the 
other hand, there are the examples where the invention does get done, notwithstanding 
the fact that the relevant Sij is much smaller than one.   In fact, there are hypothetical 
worlds where arbitrarily large fractions of the potential net social gains are successfully 
realized, simply because the appropriability test is easy to pass when the Ci values are 
small and some of the Vij values are very large, and the population of opportunities  9
contains a high proportion of such cases.  That inventors get a small fraction of the 
realized gains in such worlds is relevant to the wealth of the inventive class (or the 
assignees of its patents), but not to progress.  What is potentially quite relevant to 
progress, however, is the possibility that the pursuit of a high Sij might motivate the 
design of strategies with Vij considerably smaller than Vi*, the hypothetical first-best 
social benefit that could accrue if the constraint of covering the inventor’s costs did not 
have to be honored. 
The less invention depends on effort, the more credibility attaches to the “hypothetical 
worlds” just referred to.  If invention depends minimally on effort but more on insight or 
happenstance, or if its effort costs are reduced by the direct consumption (or reputational) 
benefits of “tinkering,” invention might abound in spite of low appropriability.  But it 
seems hard to imagine worlds in which innovation would prosper similarly, given the 
investment commitments often involved.  Skepticism about the relevance of “effort” in 
the context of innovation is distinctly harder to maintain. 
Arrow announced the conclusion that, if there was something that made monopoly 
superior to competition in terms of promoting innovation, it must have something to do 
with appropriability.  In a sense, therefore, Arrow followed Schumpeter in suggesting the 
relevance of market structure to appropriability while not attempting to fully explicate 
such a relationship.  
David Teece 
Many features of the Teece paper (Teece 1986), not least its title and its wealth of 
instructive examples, testify to the fact that this is not an exercise in abstract theory.  
Rather, Teece sought to illuminate practical issues of business strategy and economic  10
organization, and his treatment is remarkable for its sophistication, nuance and 
comprehensiveness.  Many of his brief asides would warrant a paper if fully developed. It 
is certainly not surprising that the paper has been such a rich source of inspiration to 
others. 
My central claim here is that this classic contribution is also very significant and fruitful 
at a more abstract theoretical level, although I believe that many of these gains still 
remain uncaptured at this point for want of … well, for want of suitable complementary 
efforts.  Specifically, Teece’s discussion of access to complementary assets offers one 
very helpful way to unpack much previous discussion of links between market structure 
and innovation.  After this unpacking is done, an “obvious” point becomes clearly visible 
for the first time -- and as so often happens in such cases of key insight, it seems puzzling 
ex post that it could have been missed for so long.  Another thing that appears, one that is 
likely implicated in the oversight, is the fact that the “market structure” framing was 
actually not very helpful for analytical purposes.  Much more helpful is a contracting 
perspective, which in fact Teece applied to great effect. 
The obvious point is, there are key issues involving the boundaries of the innovation 
itself, and these issues have a complex interdependence with the questions of 
appropriability and strategy.  This point was largely missed in the theoretical literature, 
especially in the more formal part.  It was understandably difficult for theorists to resist 
the temptation to begin (as usual) by stripping away the ontological complexities and 
posit “an innovation” – a recognizable discrete entity of strictly determinate character.  In 
reality, however, an innovation at its early stages – consisting perhaps of an invention 
plus some ideas about its application --presents a rich variety of potentials, a set of  11
options that might be pursued in diverse ways.  This range of meaning for what the 
innovation is has much to do with the range of appropriability strategies available to the 
innovator.  Unfortunately, it often seems that when theorists make a sensible decision to 
repress complexity temporarily for the sake of analytical progress, they often proceed to 
develop habits of thought that then prove hard to break – and the promise implicit in 
“temporarily” remains unredeemed.  Something like this seems to have affected the 
theoretical literature of innovation. 
Teece’s contribution provided a critically important entry point for understanding the rich 
variety of situations that reality can present.  In the nature of the case, such a contribution 
cannot be summarized in a single sweeping conclusion.  As the decision flow charts in 
his paper indicate, the general conclusion is “it all depends;” and the point and value of 
the analysis is to explain what it depends on.  In what follows here I consider a series of 
special cases to illustrate general points about the relationship of appropriability to 
complementary assets.
5 
In the simplest case, an aspiring innovator brings to the economy an innovative concept 
that can yield its full utility when combined with various other things the economy 
already contains in precisely the required form.  Further, the economy not only 
“contains” these things but offers them in competitive markets at established prices.  It 
must also be assumed that there prices are “given” in the strong sense that they that 
would be little affected if the innovation were to be applied at its maximum potential 
scale.   If an innovation is presumed to be based ultimately on non-rivalrous information, 
                                                 
5  I do not explore here the important connection between the appropriability/complementary assets nexus 
and another of Teece’s conceptual contributions, dynamic capability; see my brief discussion of this in 
(Winter 2000).  12
its scale of application is not limited by any scarcity inherent in the innovation itself, and 
no a priori limit can therefore be set to the value transformation that a single innovation 
works on valuations in the system as a whole.
6  Aside from this last point, the setting 
posited here so much resembles the familiar theoretical picture of competitive general 
equilibrium that we might as well call it that.  
In this posited setting, the question of the boundaries of the innovation is of no 
consequence.  One could assume at one extreme that the core novelty involved is 
somehow strictly independent of everything else, e.g., it is a novel process producing a 
novel product that enters directly into consumer utility functions.  Or one could, on the 
contrary, assume that in order to realize value from the core novelty it is necessary to 
combine it in complex ways with a number of existing products and services.
7  Under the 
conditions assumed above, these apparently contrasting cases are fundamentally the same 
-- because, if access to the required complements is totally non-problematic, it doesn’t 
matter how much of it is required.  This is the situation that Teece discusses under the 
“contractual modes” heading, where “complementary assets are available in competitive 
supply (i.e., there is adequate capacity and a choice of sources).”  (p. 293).  The fact that 
complementary assets do not play a central role does not itself dispatch the question of 
imitation, i.e., the question of the “appropriability regime.” 
Arrow’s competitive case presumes the quintessential “tight appropriability regime” that 
Teece discussed, and evidently the complements are either not required at all or are 
                                                 
6 In other words, while one can conceptualize firms or consumers in ways that make it reasonable to 
assume that each is “small” relative to the system as a whole, there is no logical basis for assuming in 
general that innovations are small relative to the system. 
7 I use the term “core novelty” in an effort to exempt myself from the afore-mentioned hazards of 
presuming that the “innovation” is discrete and well-defined before the appropriability problem is 
addressed.     13
readily accessed.  Arrow’s monopoly innovator corresponds similarly to Teece’s brief 
treatment of the case where “the innovator is already a large enterprise with many of the 
relevant complementary assets under its control.”  (p. 295).  Here the complementary 
asset position is critical, but is almost automatically sufficient to assure appropriability.  
Legal protection for intellectual property is in this context redundant. 
In my work with Richard Nelson, we used simulation methods to examine returns to 
innovative R&D under various specifications of an industry under conditions of 
Schumpeterian competition  (Nelson and Winter 1982; Nelson and Winter 1982).  The 
critical assumption of our analysis – our interpretation of what Schumpeter meant or 
should have meant in his remarks on the large enterprise – was that the innovator could 
apply new, lower-cost production methods across his existing capacity, and might (or 
might not) be able to forestall imitation by others. This assumption provides a perspective 
on innovation in imperfectly competitive settings which, in effect, views the mechanisms 
of the Arrow monopoly case as being at work when monopoly does not actually obtain, 
but firms are of diverse sizes.  The point is, whatever use the innovating firm can itself 
make of the innovation provides a step toward appropriating the returns – and it is a large 
step when the firm is large and secrecy is effective or imitation is otherwise forestalled.  
There is a fundamental scale economy in capturing the returns from R&D/innovation, 
and the “scale” that often matters is the scale of application in the innovating firm.
8   
Of course, the reference to “existing capacity” signals the fact that this range of cases is 
in fact one special case of Teece’s complementary assets scheme: when seeking to profit 
                                                 
8 Steven Klepper subsequently placed this point center stage in the theoretical models use to interpret  his 
many empirical studies of industry evolution.  See, e.g., Klepper, S. (1996). "Entry, exit, growth and 
innovation over the product life cycle." American Economic Review 86: 562-583..  14
from an idea about how to reduce production costs, it can be quite handy to have a lot of 
production capacity available on which to implement it.  It is hard, at least for me, to 
resist the judgment that this mechanism must be a strong and reliable contributor to the 
progressiveness of capitalist organization.  Consider, by way of elaboration of this 
judgment, that whoever sees business firms as highly idiosyncratic in their methods is 
thereby affirming the existence of multiple domains of potential innovation in which 
appropriability is strongly favored, independent of the legal context.   
It is striking, in retrospect, to reflect that the general point about access to complementary 
assets did not jump out at us when we applied the special case in the context of cost-
reducing innovation – just as, previously, Schumpeter and Arrow had not previously 
identified this line of thinking when discussing issues to which it plainly applies.   It is 
also striking that, having modeled Schumpeterian competition in the way we did, Nelson 
and I did not insist on a prominent position for the complementary assets mechanism 
(even for the capacity case we had featured in our models) when we participated in the 
design of the Yale survey of R&D managers (Levin, Klevorick et al. 1987).  Much more 
satisfactory in this respect was the subsequent CMU survey, an effort led by Wesley 
Cohen (Cohen, Nelson et al. 2004).  But that was not only post-Yale survey, post- Nelson 
and Winter, post-Arrow, and post-Schumpeter, but also post-Teece! 
Thus, Teece saw clearly something that many predecessors had missed, though they were 
struggling for insight in closely related areas.  Further, his insight was of great generality 
and broad application.  The above review focuses on the value of this insight in a range of 
relatively simple theoretical contexts where complementary assets are sometimes of 
critical importance and sometimes not, but in any case they are not all that interesting  15
from a business strategy viewpoint.  Teece, however, was concerned with those 
interesting cases above all.  To conclude this note, I offer some observations 
characterizing the economic logic of the interesting cases.   
 
Notes on the interesting cases 
To delimit these cases, we now depart from the previous scheme and suppose that the 
realization of value from the core novelty requires that it be complemented with goods or 
services that the pre-innovation economy does not contain, or contains in amount that is 
limited relative to the additional demands that full implementation of the innovation 
would require.  One simple case is that the required complements are simply limited in 
supply, relative to the potential scope of the innovation, so that a price rise for the 
complements will occur if the innovation is introduced and fully implemented.
9  Another 
possibility, closer to Teece’s focus, is that the complements are modified forms of 
existing goods and services.  While not something that involves creativity or novelty 
comparable to the innovation itself, the modification can only be accomplished through 
specific investments of significant magnitude.
10  The need for such investments raises the 
question of who will finance them, and also the prospect of transactional hazards that 
                                                 
9 This could appropriately be dubbed “the Hirshleifer case;” it raises the possibility that the innovator can 
appropriate gains by a timely move to take a long position in the complementary assets.Hirshleifer, J. 
(1971). "The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity." Ibid. 61: 561-
574..  Examples can be constructed in which the revaluation effect is so large that the innovator 
appropriates more than the total benefit, leaving the rest of society the loser.  See also Teece (1986), at p. 
295.   
10 In retrospect, such modifications may come to be seen as partially constitutive of “the innovation,”  
especially if they do involve design and development work of some novelty.  This is exactly the “obvious” 
point about the ambiguous “boundaries” of the innovation.  The case of the CT scanner, one of Teece’s 
examples, is a good illustration of this, particularly with respect to the role of computer technology..  16
may limit the viability of contractual modes of access to the complements (Williamson 
1979; Teece 1986). 
These considerations introduce a cluster of linked complications that are absent from the 
previous picture.    Basically, they imply that there are multiple participants who may 
have a claim on some of the rents that the completed innovation might produce, and the 
specific nature of those claims is something that will be affected by the innovator’s 
choice of appropriability strategy.  The innovator has some range of choice as to the 
particular positive-sum game that will be played with these other participants, and the 
choice of that game will affect not only the returns that accrue to the various participants 
but also the shape of the innovation itself.  
The considerations that shape these games and their outcomes include, first, the 
opportunity returns that would accrue to each participant if not included in the multi-
party “deal” that yields the innovation.  This is the consideration that Teece explored with 
the language of “dependence” between the innovation and the complementary assets     
(p. 289) – dependence which may be bilateral, or unilateral in either direction.  A high 
opportunity return means low dependence on the other participants; such an actor does 
not seriously need to do the deal. A formalization of Teece’s analysis might posit, for 
each possible structuring of the innovation game, a total return, the opportunity returns of 
the participating actors, and a characterization of the nature of each actor’s participation.  
In such situations, predictions about quantitative outcomes are a challenging goal for 
formal theory.  What is clear, however, is that the tool kit of non-zero-sum game theory 
has ready application here (Brandenburger and Harborne W. Stuart 1996; Lippman and 
Rumelt 2003).     17
A second major consideration is the nature the (legal) appropriability regime, i.e., the 
strength of intellectual property protection.  One way to introduce this consideration is to 
view it as further subdividing the type of analysis suggested in the previous paragraph 
according to two or more alternative “modes of participation” of the focal firm.  Teece’s 
“tight appropriability regimes” are cases where the focal firm is bringing to the table the 
innovation itself; it cannot be excluded from the deal because its IP position gives it veto 
power.  At the other extreme, the focal firm has zero IP protection and is in this sense one 
among several holders of relevant assets that have the potential to generate the 
innovation’s rents when appropriately combined.  Others (imitators) might possibly go 
forward by themselves if Focal tried to hold out for too big a share.  In this case, clearly, 
everything depends on Focal’s possible contribution and the possible substitutes for it.  If 
Focal is actually an independent inventor with nothing to contribute to the cause but a 
good idea and a patent that won’t actually protect, the prospects for Focal look grim.
11  If, 
however, Focal has 100% of the relevant distribution channels, or of the manufacturing 
capacity, the weakness of the patent may be irrelevant (as in the case of the monopolist 
innovator considered previously).  The problem of cutting a deal with other participants 
remains in any case; veto power over the deal is not an entitlement to 100% of the 
surplus. 
Conclusion 
As suggested previously, the great value of Teece’s analysis of appropriability lies in the 
power it confers to locate the essential elements in a very wide range of complex 
                                                 
11 However, this presumes that the idea is observable in use, so that secrecy is not effectively available as a 
protection mode.  The inventor might still keep the secret , of course, but could not do that and also get 
wealthy from it.  18
situations.  Although my discussion touches on only a small portion of that range, I hope 
that it may serve to illustrate this point – and to illustrate as well that the Teece analysis is 
second to none in placing the analysis of appropriability on a sound logical footing (its 
disarmingly “relevant” presentation notwithstanding).      19
References  
Arrow, K. J. (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. The 
rate and direction of inventive activity. R. Nelson. Princton, N.J., Princeton 
University Press: 609-625. 
Brandenburger, A. and J. Harborne W. Stuart (1996). "Value-based business strategy." 
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 5: 5-24. 
Cohen, W. M., R. R. Nelson, et al. (2004). Protecting their intellectual assets:  
Appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not). 
Cambridge, Mass., National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Dasgupta, P. and J. Stiglitz (1980). "Uncertainty, industrial structure, and the speed of 
R&D." The Bell Journal of Economics 11(1): 1-28. 
Hirshleifer, J. (1971). "The private and social value of information and the reward to 
inventive activity." American Economic Review 61: 561-574. 
Klepper, S. (1996). "Entry, exit, growth and innovation over the product life cycle." 
American Economic Review 86: 562-583. 
Levin, R. C., A. Klevorick, et al. (1987). "Appropriating the returns from industrial 
research and development." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 3: 783-
820. 
Lippman, S. and R. Rumelt (2003). "A bargaining perspective on resource advantage." 
Strategic Management Journal 24: 1060-1086. 
Nelson, R. R. and S. G. Winter (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
Nelson, R. R. and S. G. Winter (1982). "The Schumpeterian Trade-Off Revisited." 
American Economic Review 72(March 1982): 114-132. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York, Harper and 
Row. 
Teece, D. J. (1986). "Profiting from technological innovation." Research Policy 15(6): 
285-305. 
Williamson, O. (1979). "Transaction cost economics: the governance of contractual 
relations." Journal of Law and Economics 22: 233-261. 
Winter, S.G. (2000).  "Appropriating the gains from innovation," in G. Day and P. 
Schoemaker, eds., Wharton on Managing Emerging Technologies."  New York, 
Wiley. 
 